International Competitiveness of the European Union’ High-tech Sector

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Abstract

For a long time, the European Union has been losing the competition in high technology for the market share between three countries – USA, EU and China. This trend has been observed since 2007, although the rate of decline in competitiveness has been small, averaging 0.6–0.7% per year. However, a turning point occurred in 2022 when the EU's share in the global market of high-tech products began to grow against the background of China's declining share. The paper considers trends in the EU exports of high- and medium-high-tech products and structural changes taking place in this global market. The purpose of this article is to quantify the competitiveness of the EU in high-tech industries, as well as to identify commodity niches that the EU can maintain and/or develop. The subject of the paper is the latest tendencies in these processes. The author focuses on the statistics published by Eurostat, UNIDO, World Bank. The study showed that the EU's share in global exports of medium- and high-tech goods was greater than that of the United States and China combined and amounted to 33.7% in 2023 (USA – 8.4%, China – 17.4%). The share of high-tech goods in the EU manufacturing exports increased from 15.3% in 2008 to 19.1% in 2023. In 2023, the EU was able to regain the 32.5% market share of high-tech products from the three centers of power that it had 15 years ago. It can be considered the main achievement of the EU in high technology sector.

About the authors

V. G Varnavskii

Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)

Email: varnavsky@imemo.ru
Doctor of Sciences (Economics), Professor Moscow, Russia

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