This article is devoted to cooperation between the People's Republic of China and East Timor (Timor-Leste) as part of Chinese cultural and economic expansion to Southeast Asia. There're a number of reasons for this kind of support, including traditional backup for Timor's independence, China's desire to diversify its energy sources and gain new markets for Chinese goods; consolidate its status as an important partner of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and to prevent the possible growing influence of Taiwan (the Republic of China). Economically, China for Timor-Leste means cheap imports and potential exports; while Timor remains the base for many projects of Chinese businessmen ever since its getting independence, despite the crisis of 2006. This cooperation leads to impact on other significant actors in the region, such as Indonesia and Australia, which also support Timor, as well as the United States; which oppose the expansion of Beijing's influence in this geostrategically important area. The example of Timor-Leste also illustrates the growing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy and its commitment to using soft power as a counter to the obsolete perception of China as a threat that prevailed earlier in Southeast Asia. In conclusion, if Timorese oil reserves run low, cooperation between two states can be slightly transformed from economic to military; however, the radical changes in Timor's foreign policy, which struggled for their independence for so long, are unlikely.
Kitay, Vostochnyy Timor, Sodruzhestvo portugaloyazychnyh stran, luzofony, Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya, Avstraliya, Indoneziya, strategicheskoe sotrudnichestvo, ekonomicheskaya ekspansiya
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